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1 Introduction 
The typical approach employed by the international community to assist countries in 
transition from violent conflicts involves inserting a peacekeeping force, establishing an 
interim government based on a power-sharing arrangement among antagonistic armed 
groups, and holding elections. Democratic governance is considered introduced by 
holding national elections and post-conflict reconstruction planning commenced with 
needs assessment surveys. While national elections are an important activity in the 
reconstitution of governing arrangements in post-conflict situations, they cannot yield 
systems of sustainable governance; neither can all the formal institutions and processes 
of government by themselves. The informal institutions through which people reach 
understandings among themselves, resolve conflicts and undertake a variety of 
collective actions are critical foundations of self-governance. As important as are 
assessments of needs for developing inventories of what is perceived to be lacking in 
local communities, such assessments do not always tell the full story because they do 
not always assess available capabilities such as the stocks of social capital of local 
communities.  
This paper shows that informal institutions were critical to the survival of local people 
during state collapse and violent conflicts in Liberia as they are in many other conflict 
situations. It argues that if used to buttress formal institutions, many of these informal 
institutions can become important building blocks in the reconstitution of post-conflict 
governance arrangements. Prevailing post-conflict reconstruction strategies focus 
typically on identifying and repairing formal organizations and physical infrastructures 
and tend to ignore the informal arrangements that sustain people over years of state 
failure. While there have been many disastrous formal and informal organizational 
arrangements in Liberia, there are still some very healthy informal arrangements that 
have not been well recognized. Failure to recognize these has frequently led to the 
presumption of a social capital deficit and, therefore, the need to look outside for such 
resource. This paper, therefore, argues that unlocking such capital is important in 
enabling people to make transitions from short-term survival strategies to more 
productive long-term arrangements. I, first, briefly discuss the toll of conflict as a legacy 
of a failed over-centralized and predatory government in Liberia and then turn to 
equally brief discussions of how, during years of violent conflicts, informal institutions 
and networks were used by local people to ensure their security, resolve conflicts and 
provide other public goods. I conclude by stressing the importance of informal 
institutions as building blocks in the constitution of self-governing orders in post-
conflict situations as Liberia. 
2 Violent conflict as a legacy of the over-centralized and predatory governance 
Liberia’s political order emerged as an over-centralized and predatory order that turned 
increasingly repressive as pressures for inclusion intensified over the years. Despite 
formal laws that established a legislature and a judiciary as independent and co-equal 
bodies, Liberia’s political order evolved for a century with powers concentrated in the 
hands of the president. It ultimately collapsed under such pressures as external support 
declined with the ending of the Cold War. In 1980 a group of semiliterate 
noncommissioned officers of the Liberian military staged a coup d’etat and established 
a military government that rapidly degenerated into a brutal dictatorship. In 1985, 
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rigged elections and an attempted coup triggered a protracted violent conflict that 
engulfed the entire country and in 14 years made Liberia the center of a wider system of 
violent conflicts in the Mano basin area of Liberia, Sierra Leone and the forest region of 
Guinea. More about 200,000 or six per cent of Liberia’s population was killed; about a 
700,000 Liberians sought refuge abroad at one time or another and more than a million 
were internally displaced and villages, towns and cities in all parts of the country. 
Leaders of armed groups turned young children into fighters, young girls into ‘war 
wives’ and killed and demeaned elders. Millions of dollars of property was destroyed or 
stolen. As the conflict raged on, Liberia became a source of illicit international trade 
items as armed bands plundered the resources of the country and sold them on 
international markets. In such circumstances, ordinary people who stood vulnerable to 
the assault of such predators were left to rely upon external humanitarian assistance 
where available and their own resourcefulness. By seeking to understand what kinds of 
survival strategies were available to local people, we broaden our understanding of how 
social capital enables collective action and constitutes foundations for human survival. 
3 Social capital and collective action 
Hernando de Soto (2000) has reminded us that poor people are poor not because they 
lack assets but because they are not always able to transform their assets into productive 
capital and to optimally use such capital. Understanding how social capital is created 
and utilized in society is of critical importance in assessing capacity for self-reliant 
development. Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) argument that understanding how people craft or 
adapt institutions of collective action provides clues regarding their possibilities for self-
governance can be extended to embrace situations of governance failure and violent 
conflict where survival is at stake. Studies of how local people survive in situations of 
violent conflicts focus typically on how behaviour of belligerent parties affecting local 
people are constrained by the intervention of national and external actors. Creation of 
‘zones of peace’ and demarcation of ‘security corridors’ for the delivery of emergency 
assistance by international humanitarian organizations are among strategies often 
analyzed. Conflict resolution strategies are also typically analyzed with respect to the 
initiatives of third-party mediation and facilitation (Hartzell 1999; Walter 1999). 
Important as these external interventions are, they do not exhaust the efforts that enable 
local people to survive amid such hostilities and resolve conflicts among themselves. 
External intervention alone cannot provide lasting solutions to security and governance 
dilemmas within a society, thus, understanding social capital among local people may 
offer insights for building self-governing capabilities. How did local people survive 
amid plunder, pillage and carnage that characterize internal wars in African countries? 
How do they constitute or adapt mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts among 
themselves? What potentials do these forms of social capital have for post-conflict 
reconstruction? This paper explores these questions in the case of the Liberian 
experience. 
3.1 Social capital and survival strategies 
There is hardly a more inauspicious opportunity to observe how people build and use 
social capital than that which is offered in circumstances where people are confronted 
with grave insecurities and uncertainties.  In situations of violent conflict when the rule 
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of law breaks down, people are left largely to find recourse in norms, relationships and 
institutional arrangements which they create themselves or have inherited over the years 
through customs and traditions. In such situations when people take advantage of lull 
between firefights to find food and other goods, an enterprising young man may identify 
an opportunity to organize a group using wheelbarrows to provide a service transporting 
goods for local people where, due to shortage of gasoline and commandeering of 
vehicles by armed groups, automobiles are unavailable or in short supply. 
Entrepreneurial skills, establishing trusting relationships beyond one’s immediate 
family and associates and crafting and effectively implementing appropriate rules are all 
important elements in building stocks of social capital. But social capital can also be 
used for harmful purposes. For example, networks of armed individuals may constitute 
marauding gangs and harm others. The use of social capital may well have harmful 
externalities for some and constructive outcomes for others. That is why understanding 
externalities and developing the ability to internalize negative externalities are crucial in 
using social capital for collective action (Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Ostrom 2005).  
3.2 The availability of international humanitarian assistance  
Hundreds of thousands of Liberians, victims of the decade and a half of conflict, owe 
their survival to the humanitarian assistance provided by the international community. 
In 1990, West African peacekeepers who arrived in Monrovia met a society so 
desperate for food that soldiers had to share their rations with local people. Although 
there are no comprehensive estimates of humanitarian assistance to Liberia, anecdotal 
estimates run high. Between 1990 and 1995, the United State is said to have provided 
US$381 million in humanitarian assistance. In 1997, the World Food Programme 
targeted its food assistance programme to 1.05 million people, three-quarters of whom 
were internally displaced. Numerous international humanitarian organizations 
contributed emergency relief during the period of violent conflict. And yet all those 
needing assistance could not receive assistance or could not survive solely on the 
assistance received. Several challenges confronted the dispensing of humanitarian 
assistance. In some cases, logistical difficulties reduced access to humanitarian 
assistance. This was frequently the case in the rainy season when roads became 
impassible and bridges were swept away. In other cases, armed bands held groups of 
people hostage as a means of seizing humanitarian rations provided to vulnerable 
groups. There were situations in which limited assistance would be provided after long 
intervals, clearly leaving local people to their own devices. Many communities could 
not be reached at all. In 1997, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA) reported that several areas in Liberia had not 
been accessed by international relief agencies in seven years. While international relief 
organizations were able to assist hundreds of thousands of people, there remained a 
significant gap between the survival needs of local people and the humanitarian 
assistance delivered to them. Large numbers of local people still had to rely partially or 
wholly on their own resourcefulness. In the next three sections I describe how under 
circumstances of violent assault by armed bands, local communities struggled to 
provide for their security, resolve community-based conflicts and, where possible, 
engaged in community development undertakings. 
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4 Security strategies and mechanisms 
4.1 Coping with insecurity 
Domination of local communities by the central state has been a defining feature and 
most enduring characteristic of autocracy in Liberia as is the case elsewhere in Africa 
(Wunsch and Oluwo 1990). Control by the presidency over the process of selecting 
chiefs and local leaders and their manipulation by that office is a strategy of domination 
and predation inherent in the nature of autocratic rule in Liberia (Liebenow 1969; Dunn 
and Tarr 1988; Sawyer 1992). State-sponsored violence has always been one of the 
instruments that ensured control. However, during the years of military rule, such 
violence became the main instrument of control.1 Local officials were routinely 
harassed, violently intimidated, and capriciously hired and dismissed. Such practices 
were intensified when the civil war broke out in 1989. For most of the period of violent 
conflict, every town and village in Liberia was not only affected by violence but also 
ruled by an armed commander or an individual associated with an armed group. Young 
ex-combatants and their associates constituted the largest number of village and 
township heads. This pattern remained unchanged until 2003 when an interim 
government was established as part of the peace settlement. Although responses of 
villagers and townspeople to their new rulers varied, in almost every case, local 
communities sought recourse in traditional institutions in order to cope with the security 
dilemmas they faced. Examples from northwestern and southeastern Liberia reveal 
variability in forms of community responses to the problem of physical security posed 
by armed groups.  
4.2 Poro authority and armed rule at the village level  
In many parts of northern and northwestern Liberia, villagers adapted to the rule of their 
new armed leaders through Poro solidarity. Poro has been the foundation pan-ethnic 
social institution embracing the collective social and historical experiences of most Mel 
and Mande-speaking groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea. It is considered to be 
of a deeper order of legitimacy than any group of secular rulers and commands a wider 
pool of resources than those available to any single ethnic community. With deep roots 
in vast sections of the rain forest, Poro institutions have been embedded in social 
organization from the level of the village to higher levels of authority. With hierarchical 
and gerontocratic principles central to its operations, Poro was a source of stability in 
the rain forest prior to spread of Islam or the establishment of European colonial control 
(Little 1966). Despite commitment to its principles, Poro organization has seemed 
flexible when necessary and provided scope to accommodate opportunistic behaviour in 
adapting to change (d’Azevedo 1962).  
 
                                                 
1 The period of military rule in Liberia began with the military takeover of 1980. Although in 1986, the 
military leader Samuel Doe was elected in rigged elections, the pattern of post-elections rule did not differ 
substantially from the preceding five years. Threat and use of military force, decrees, and strongman 
arbitrariness were as much the dominant features of post-elections rule as they were earlier. Thus, except 
where otherwise stated, the entire period of control by Doe (1980 to 1989) is referred to as the period of 
military rule.  
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One way in which Poro authority sought to protect rural dwellers during the violent 
conflict was to co-opt the young armed leaders. In several towns, local people clothed 
their ‘armed chiefs’ with the traditional chieftain authority and quickly constituted 
advisory councils in accordance with traditional practices.2 These councils sought to 
constrain the actions of armed fighter-chiefs. In other situations, Poro authority 
constituted a parallel but unobtrusive authority structure that supported some of the 
actions of the new armed leaders where considered appropriate while artfully and 
quietly organizing resistance where necessary and feasible to protect the interest of local 
people. Historically, the dynamics of co-optation between central government and Poro 
has worked both ways: Liberian government officials have often co-opted Poro symbols 
and Poro authority has often adapted opportunistic behaviour vis-à-vis the government. 
More widely understood is how the president and his senior officials have over the years 
attempted to influence Poro authority. In the last 25 years, both presidents Doe and 
Taylor imposed themselves on Poro as its highest authority. What has now become 
evident is how in recent times, Poro authority and local communities have also adopted 
strategies of manipulation and accommodation to ensure their survival.3 Thus, by co-
opting the new leaders, Poro authorities of villages and towns sought to restrain the 
actions and behaviours of armed men who operated with hardly any supervision and 
owed loyalty only to a warlord.  
4.3 Community retreat and the formation of auxiliary forces 
In southeastern Liberia where the Poro does not exist and where communities are 
acephalous, some communities tended to respond to the imposition of the rule of armed 
bands by retreating from their towns and villages to smaller hamlets located deeper in 
the rainforest. Households retreated as a unit. Villages and towns are typically smaller 
in the southeast than those found elsewhere in the country. Although most forest 
communities sought sanctuary in the forest at one time or another, members of 
southeastern communities were on the run more frequently between 1990 and 1998 and 
constrained to abandon their towns and villages for longer periods of time. Southeastern 
villages and towns remained sparsely populated for years after fighting ceased. There 
are two reasons for this situation: first, the isolation of the southeast from other parts of 
the country and the small size of towns provided ideal settings for armed rulers to 
operate with greater levels of impunity. Second, there is an absence in southeastern 
Liberia of strong pan-ethnic institutions capable of imposing order across clan and 
ethnic groups. Kwee is a social institution that exists across many clans and in many 
ethnic groups of southeastern Liberia; however, unlike Poro in northern and western 
Liberia, Kwee’s authority is circumscribed and its scope of operation limited.  
In coastal southeastern areas that were not forested, a common strategy used widely was 
to mobilize local men in age-set units for defense of local communities. These units 
operated in association with the occupying armed group. Local elders negotiated with 
the occupying armed group to have such local militia units accepted as part of the 
occupying armed group. In this way, local communities were often tentatively spared 
                                                 
2 Author’s interview with informant.  
3 D’Azevedo (1969-1971) saw the offer of Gola girls as wives to settler leaders and government 
officials as elements of Gola strategy for accommodation with the Liberian state.  
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the ravages of armed bands. However, violence always flared up when another armed 
group sought to dislodge an occupying band. Suspicions ran high between local forces 
and occupying groups and arrangements of cooperation often broke down.  
Thus, what we see are patterns of responses to security threats rooted largely in the 
nature of indigenous social organization extant in an area. Poro as the foundation of 
social organization and authority relations in northwestern Liberia and trans-boundary 
communities in Sierra Leone and Guinea provided the institutional framework for 
responding to the onslaught of the new armed rulers. Even though community responses 
might have differed tactically, Poro hierarchies remained significant actors in providing 
institutional responses to armed assault in most communities of the northwestern 
Liberia. A different pattern obtained in southeastern Liberia where communities are 
mainly acephalous and do not have a dominant pan-ethnic organization. Communities 
formed smaller clusters of families and sought refuge deep within the rainforest or 
mobilized local forces and negotiated with armed groups to have such forces used as 
auxiliaries of such armed bands but assigned to these communities. In all cases, local 
people found recourse in indigenous and local institutions to cope with their security 
dilemmas.    
5 Local institutions and conflict resolution 
5.1 Poro authority and inter-ethnic conflict resolution in northwestern Liberia 
Poro authority has also been a force for ending violence and managing and resolving 
inter-ethnic conflicts. The case of violent clashes between Mandingo and Loma 
communities in Zorzor is illustrative and deserves discussion. Mandingo and Loma have 
lived together in the same villages and towns in the area of Zorzor district on Liberia’s 
border with Guinea since before the founding of Liberia. Both communities are part of 
larger ethnic communities that extend into Guinea. Mandingo are largely Moslems 
while Loma are Christians, Moslems and adherents to forms of traditional worship. 
Poro is an important institution in Loma society but not in Mandingo; nonetheless, 
Mandingo have always shown respect for Poro authority. The two ethnic communities 
have been closely linked through inter-marriage (more often Loma women to Mandingo 
men), shared mythologies and history.4 Joint mechanisms of conflict resolution evolved 
between the two communities typically, at the level of the village or town, include 
processes through which elders of the various quarters constitute a court whose 
decisions are supported by the chief and council and enforced ultimately (if necessary) 
by Poro authority in the case of the Loma and Quranic authority in the case of the 
Mandingo. Since the consolidation of the Liberian state, state-based conflict resolution 
processes intervened and imposed a higher level of authority through the interior 
bureaucracy and a judiciary. Under strains of violent conflicts in recent times, 
Mandingo accused the Loma of not only abandoning the commitment to protect them 
but of joining the onslaught against them. They accused Loma youth of torching 
mosques and demeaning Mandingo elders. The Loma, in turn, accused the Mandingo of 
ethnic targeting in the latter’s retaliatory strikes and of desecrating Loma Poro groves. 
They accused Mandingo youth of defacing Loma Poro objects and absconding into 
                                                 
4 See Sawyer et al. 2000a. 
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Guinea with them. Both sides accused each other of breaking the age-old covenant that 
had bonded them. Both communities have been seething with bitterness and suspicion 
against each other. 
Reconciliation between the two groups has become one of the most important post-
conflict challenges. Government’s mediation was superficial, confined largely to mass 
meetings presided over by central government functionaries and targeted more to 
winning support of both communities than bridging the divide between them. Moreover, 
actions of central government’s security operatives also tended to exacerbate the 
problem (Sawyer et al. 2000a). Non-governmental organizations serving as facilitators 
were better able to get both sides to begin a dialogue.5 As dialogue progressed, Poro 
leaders from Loma communities in Guinea were said to have been indispensable in 
initiating a process of re-covenanting. Pan-Poro solidarity provided a context for 
security and a framework for problem-solving among the Loma. Loma Poro objects 
were retrieved through pan-Poro channels that involved the intervention of Guinean 
Loma communities with their Mandingo compatriots. Appropriate rites of restoration 
were performed and with due respect accorded by the Mandingo, the basis for 
reconciliation was established. The Mandingo received assistance from Loma 
communities in the construction or renovation of mosques and both communities were 
subsequently engaged in establishing joint mechanisms for early warning and for 
dispute settlement. Such mechanisms operated with the endorsement of both Poro and 
Quranic authority.6 As a result of the impact of such local conflict resolution processes, 
continued violent conflicts in the wider region between central government forces and 
dissident groups did not further strain the relation between Loma and Mandingo, as was 
the case earlier in the conflict.7 Thus, the Poro seems to have partially provided a nested 
arrangement for local mechanisms of conflict resolution as the Liberian government 
itself became more deeply involved as a party to armed conflict. 
5.2 Resolving conflicts over property rights in northern Liberia 
Post-war conflict resolution among the Mano, Gio and Mandingo of northern Liberia 
has taken a different pattern from that seen among the Loma and Mandingo of Zorzor 
district, Lofa County. Unlike their ethnic kinsfolk of the northwest, the Mandingo of 
northern Liberia are relatively newcomers to the area. Most were traders from Guinea 
who settled in Mano and Gio country and married local women. While many Gio 
embraced Islam, the Mano remained a Poro community.8 Mainly agriculturists, Mano 
                                                 
5 The Center for Democratic Empowerment, the Catholic Peace and Justice Commission and the 
Lutheran World Federation are among the non-governmental organizations that have played facilitation 
roles. 
6 There is no sense of Sharia legal application in these matters. Mandingo Islamic clerics operate in 
conjunction with Mandingo elders, many of whom are of mixed parentage. 
7 The use of indigenous institutions as mechanisms for conflict resolution is an important strategy 
currently employed in Rwanda. The Gacaca is an indigenous institution considered legitimate by both 
Hutu and Tutsi for the settlement of disputes. It is now playing a role in resolving certain conflicts 
connected with the genocide of 1994. See Neuffer (2000); New York Times 7 October 2001. 
8 Chief Tuazama of the Gio town of Bahn is said to have been a convert to Islam and to have given 
many Gio girls in marriage to Mandingo men. 
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and Gio reached an accommodation with Mandingo traders for whom land ownership 
was not a critical concern once use rights were granted.9 With such rights, Mandingo 
traders exploited streams, creeks and riverbeds prospecting for alluvial gold and 
diamonds. They also dominated land transport and the housing market in northern 
Liberia.  
Property rights in land have become the critical issue in post-conflict relations between 
the two groups. Many Mano and Gio communities revoked land use rights granted to 
Mandingo. The Mandingo, on the other hand, demanded the restoration of property 
rights said to be granted by central state through licenses and mining claims. 
Community-based approaches to the settlement of land disputes have had some success. 
Ethnic leaders of Mano and Gio and Mandingo elders seemed to have agreed that all 
lands sold or otherwise given to Mandingo in urban areas should be returned to 
Mandingo owners. Thus, Mandingo-owned real property seems to have been reinstated. 
With respect to settlement of mining claims, by 2000, Mano and Gio leaders working 
through county branch office of the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy were able to 
establish a ‘rolling registration’ scheme such that Mandingo claims were considered on 
a case-by-case basis and honoured interchangeably and periodically with Mano/Gio 
claims. Consanguineous ties have been critical in the process of inter-ethnic conflict 
resolution among the Mano/Gio and Mandingo of Nimba. Individuals of mixed ethnic 
backgrounds, especially men whose fathers are Mandingo and mothers Mano or Gio 
have been able to shuttle between both communities and this has helped promote a 
sympathetic understanding on both sides. Mano/Gio elders have become more 
appreciative of Mandingo predicament as Mandingo elders have become better 
informed about the concerns of Mano and Gio community leaders. Yet a continuing 
inter-ethnic dialogue has been required. 
5.3 ‘External elite’ as conflict resolution catalysts in southeastern Liberia 
In southeastern Liberia, reconciliation among ethnic groups proceeded differently. As 
stated above, there is hardly a single indigenous institution whose legitimacy cuts across 
all communities of these acephalous groups. As a result, Kru and Sarpo elite living in 
Monrovia have been the prime initiators of reconciliation between the two groups. 
Local people have relied on the lead and advice of their educated sons in Monrovia.10 
Such ‘externally-driven’ approach to conflict resolution has not been without noticeable 
consequences. Firstly, up to the ending of hostilities generally in 2003, rifts between 
communities did not seem to be healing as fast enough as they appeared to be between 
the Loma and Mandingo of northwestern Liberia. Secondly, these Monrovia-based 
processes of reconciliation were more easily manipulated by president Charles Taylor 
up to the time of his downfall and expulsion. Rival Monrovia-based elites could hardly 
avoid the temptation of turning to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for some form of 
intervention. Thirdly, solutions evolved from such government-driven reconciliation 
processes seemed designed to redress perceived ethnic-based imbalances in 
                                                 
9 To the Mano and Gio and to all other ethnic groups in Liberia, ownership of land is inalienable. Most 
land is communal property charged to the custody of the elders of the community who serve as ‘owners of 
the land.’ Use rights can be granted but ownership can only be attained through community sale. See 
Sawyer (1992: especially chapter 10). 
10 See Sawyer et al. (2000b). 
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appointments to county-level positions in government than to heal wounds between 
people who had committed egregious breaches against each other. As a result, when 
differences among such elites about job placements proved irreconcilable, demands for 
the creation of new political jurisdictions such as new statutory districts or townships 
have been heightened.11 
The case of ethnic conflict between the Krahn and Grebo also of the southeast was even 
more illuminating with respect to the creation of new political jurisdiction as a strategy 
for the resolution of ethnic-based conflict. The military takeover of 1980 catapulted the 
Krahn to national leadership as well as local leadership in their southeastern home 
county of Grand Gedeh which they shared with the Grebo. Until then, Grebo dominance 
in local government and professional positions was due largely to their superior 
educational achievements.12 Krahn and Grebo elders and elites were unable to arrive at 
a common understanding of their differences and an approach to their resolution. 
Massive Grebo support for anti-government forces during the early years of the conflict 
was attributed in part to their desire to end Krahn domination and control of their jointly 
shared home-county. Becoming more dominant in Charles Taylor’s government, Grebo 
leaders used their new-found influence to press for the carving out a new county from 
what was Grand Gedeh County. The creation of Grebo-dominated River Gee County 
has ended the competition for central government allocated positions which has been a 
major bone of contention between Grebo and Krahn elites over the years. 
What we have seen here is that, deeply affected by violent disruptions, local 
communities found recourse for conflict resolution in their own indigenous institutional 
patterns where such institutions were available and appropriate or otherwise 
strategically involved state authorities. Poro authority interacted with Quranic authority 
to provide a basis for co-existence and gradual cooperation between the Loma and 
Mandingo of northwestern Liberia while a more issue-specific approach to conflict 
resolution seemed to be going on between the Mano and Gio on one hand and the 
Mandingo in northern Liberia. In southeastern Liberia, among the Kru and Sarpo, the 
role of elites of the two ethnic communities resident in Monrovia seemed pronounced 
and where reconciliation has proved to be more difficult due to lack of appropriate 
institutions, as is also the case between the Grebo and Krahn, local elites have opted for 
the creation of new political jurisdictions. Thus, the nature of community social 
organization has played a major role in determining prevailing responses to conflict. It 
is important to understand that all of these relationships remain under pressure and in 
various states of adaptation.  
6 Collective action and associational life under adverse circumstances 
In many instances society’s resilience can be observed in the nature and quality of 
associational life that makes survival possible in spite of state predation and collapse. 
                                                 
11 The creation of the statutory district of Tarjaurzon out of Juarzon is a more recent example.  
12 Grebo communities extend from the Atlantic coast into the interior; as such they were among the first 
ethnic groups to have access to schools first established along the coast by missionaries and later, the 
Liberian state. Located entirely inland, the Krahn lived largely in hunting and gathering communities well 
into the early decades of the twentieth century. See Schroder and Seibel (1974). 
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By associational life, I refer to the full array of collective action situations organized by 
individuals and communities in pursuit of a full range of desired outcomes.13 These 
include formal and informal groups, networks and associations established on the basis 
of a variety of membership rules for collective action for the provision, production and 
use of collective goods (Ostrom 1990; 1992). The crucial point here is a consideration 
of non-state institutional arrangements, rooted in the initiatives of local people that have 
been the source of their resilience in the face of predation and violence. Many of these 
organizations and networks have members who live outside Liberia. I briefly highlight 
some examples of how in situations of state predation, repression and violent conflicts, 
local people in both rural and urban communities have still been able to engage in 
collective action to provide some of the public goods and services essential to their 
lives. Clan and community-based organizations have been the principal institutional 
arrangements for collective action in such situations.  
6.1 Clan-based institutions of collective action 
The most enduring form of collective action that ensured community survival despite 
violent conflicts was undertaken by networks and organizations whose membership is 
based on clan-related identity. These are genuinely self-reliant and demand-driven 
groups. Typically, they are referred to as ‘development’ associations and have 
numerous voluntary groups nested within them. Organizations such as the Dugbe River 
Union in Sinoe county are well known for their multiple roles as safety nets, conflict 
resolution mechanisms and for the social and physical infrastructure development 
activities they undertake independent of the state and often, despite state predation. In 
northern Liberia, among the Mano and Gio, the accomplishments of clan-based 
organizations have been indispensable to the welfare of local communities. Seletorwaa, 
the development association of Mensonnoh Clan and Zao Development Association of 
the Zao, for example, have been extraordinary in their development initiatives. They 
have built schools, clinics and roads and have organized scholarship schemes to assist 
promising young men and women to go to college. Seletorwaa began in the early 1980s 
by members of the Mehnsonnoh clan resident in Monrovia. It was a response to the 
military takeover and its consequences on Nimba County. Among the numerous 
projects it has undertaken over the years is a clinic built in Guotowin and several 
scholarships to the young people of the clan to pursue studies at technical schools and 
institutions of higher learning in Liberia. Selezoway, the Yarwin-Mehnsonnoh District 
development association of which Seletorwaa is a member has, over the years, 
transformed the district, building roads, market sheds, community halls and other public 
facilities.14 Women’s clubs within the development association have catered to the 
needs of sick and disabled, and have often organized for increased production of food to 
ensure food security. As self-reliant entities, clan development associations are largely 
supported by the resources of their individual and constituent community members, 
                                                 
13 Discussion about associational life in Africa frequently becomes central to the debate about what 
constitutes civil society in Africa. That debate largely centers on the potential of civil society to advance 
democracy in Africa. See Harbeson et al. (1994); Hutchful (1997); Kasfir (1998); Orvis, (2001). Although 
critical, this debate is not central to the concern of this paper. My focus is on how individuals and 
communities organize themselves for collective action to meet the variety of dilemmas they confront in 
the circumstance of state predation, collapse and violence.  
14 Interviews with members of Seletorwaa.  
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through labour quotas and through taxation of individual production. The role of clan 
members in Monrovia and abroad is critical in resource mobilization. Many such 
organizations receive regular contributions from members now resident in the United 
States. More recently, members of Seletowaa in the United States have been providing 
equipment and supplies for elementary schools in the clan.15 Clan-based development 
associations are often able to tap into external resources mobilized through 
intergovernmental entities such as those of the country offices of organizations of the 
United Nations system, the European Union and international and local non-
governmental organizations. Yet their strength is in their self-reliance. They must be 
seen as significant local capabilities for the reconstitution of post-conflict governing 
order in Liberia.  
7 Informal institutions as building blocks for constructing post-conflict self-
governing orders 
Survival strategies used by local people faced with violent conflict perpetrated by armed 
groups range from complicity and accommodation with the perpetrators to resistance. 
While some of these strategies, especially those that involved complicity with armed 
groups to harm others, pose serious huddles to post-conflict reconciliation, many others 
can appropriately serve as building blocks of a new post-conflict order. For example, 
the entrepreneurship of clan-based organizations, remittance flows of diasporic groups, 
and the self-organized deliberative forums of leaders of trans-boundary ethnic 
communities offer a rich pool of ‘informal’ institutional resources for conflict 
resolution, community development and foundations for self-governance. A 
fundamental mistake is made when post-conflict reconstruction initiatives begin with an 
assessment of needs of local communities unaccompanied by a corresponding 
assessment of capabilities such as these. The Joint Needs Assessment undertaken by the 
Liberia government, the World Bank and UNDP has ignored the fact that even before 
the collapse of the state, local clan-based and community-based associations supported 
by members and alumni associations abroad were the prime supporters of schools and 
road repair projects in several parts of Liberia.16 By failing to reflect the capabilities of 
local people and their extensions abroad, needs assessment surveys have the potential of 
reorganizing local communities for dependency and not for self-reliant development.  
The challenge of attaining lasting peace in post-conflict situations such as Liberia can 
best be met by constituting self-governing institutional arrangements rather than 
reconstituting the over-centralized state. Self-governing orders are constituted on 
foundations rooted in local communities; they draw upon the capabilities of individuals 
and local communities rather than smother or destroy them. They provide possibilities 
for building from the bottom up and of doing so in variable patterns that link 
communities in horizontal and vertical arrangements for provision of public goods. For 
                                                 
15 The amalgamated initiatives of clan-based organizations that sustain inter-clan development projects 
must not be confused with such countywide development associations that are organized by the central 
state through the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The former are the result of local initiatives; the later are 
top-down government-driven structures that seem to become very active on special occasions such as a 
pending visit of the president.  
16 See National Transitional Government of Liberia, United Nations and World Bank (2004). 
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example, a local community may build and run an elementary school while several 
working together and assisted by their diasporic members may build and run a 
secondary school. The variable principles of organization and patterns of aggregation to 
be found in local communities in Liberia as in other countries make for potentially 
robust systems of polycentric governance (Ostrom 1999). Moreover, in the case of 
Liberia, capabilities provided by sub-national trans-boundary institutions such as pan-
ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms can add resilience to governance arrangements 
and nest them in the larger Mano basin subregion that includes Sierra Leone and Guinea 
such that subregional levels of governance rooted in interactions among communities 
and not only in interactions among unitary states can be imagined. For a subregion that 
is awash in arms as a result of 14 years of violent conflict, there is no better way of 
sustaining efforts to ensure a secure environment than by establishing early warning and 
early response mechanisms that draw upon the self-organized initiatives of local peoples 
throughout the Mano basin area (see Sawyer 2004).  
What all of this means is that understanding and use of appropriate locally-based social 
capital can unlock human potential and add to the resource pool from which a society 
draws to constitute self-governing orders that can further enhance human capabilities to 
transcend destructive conflicts.  
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